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Abstract 
The belief that children thrive if educated amongst higher-achieving schoolmates guides 
many parents in their choice of school. We extend the literature on this issue by considering 
children making the transition from primary to secondary schooling at age-11 in England. We 
use year-to-year changes in school composition to identify the impact of schoolmates on pupil 
progress at age 14. Traditional ‘linear-in-means’ specifications lead us to conclude that prior 
achievements of a child’s schoolmates are, on average, unrelated to his/her academic 
progress. However, this masks evidence that lower achieving pupils are disadvantaged by 
higher achieving schoolmates, whereas upper-middle ranking pupils benefit. 
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1 Introduction 
Schools seem often to be judged on the kind of children they enrol, rather than on the quality 
of their teaching or the other facilities they offer. This observation has led many to argue that 
the background and abilities of a child’s schoolmates must have an important influence on his 
or her own achievements at school. Motivated by this argument, a rich international literature 
has evolved to try to model and measure the consequences of social interactions between 
pupils – so called ‘peer-group effects’ – spanning the economics, education, sociological and 
psychological fields. 
The issue is a critical one in respect of current educational policy which favours 
expansion of school choice, because choice based on school group composition can lead to a 
high degree of sorting across schools along lines of prior ability (e.g. Epple and Romano 
2000). An understanding of the prevalence of peer effects is also important because they 
imply that educational interventions that appear beneficial when tested on the individual pupil 
may be even more effective (or less effective) when rolled out to the population (Glaeser et al 
2003). It is also well known that peer group effects have efficiency implications when the 
effects are non-linear, or if there are complementarities between group and individual 
characteristics.  
Our paper extends the evidence base by exploring the influence on achievement of the 
large innovations in peer group composition that occur on transition at age 11 between 
primary and secondary school in England. Our main concern is to find out whether children 
progress faster during the first three years of secondary school if their new secondary 
schoolmates performed well in their end of primary school assessments at age-11. However, 
estimation of school peer-group effects and the influence of social interactions in general is 
notoriously difficult, because school groups form endogenously in ways that are related to the 
outcome in question (Moffitt 2001, Manski 1993). In the absence of any explicit random 
assignment of individuals to school groups in England, our approach to this problem is to 
apply value-added achievement models coupled with a stringent fixed effect strategy to seek 
out random variation in the process of group formation. In our context, we find that we cannot 
eliminate observable sorting on pupil prior achievement, even with stringent school-fixed-
effects and school-trend specifications. However, we can go further, and demonstrate that 
pupil sorting over time into secondary schools does not occur on the basis of differences in 
pupils’ primary school quality. Therefore origin primary school ‘value-added’ or 
effectiveness provides a source of random variation in secondary peers’ prior achievement. 
Our presentation explicitly compares the association between individual and group prior 
achievement at age 11 – which arises through sorting at the point of group formation – with 
the association between individual age-14 and peers’ age-11 achievement that exists after the 
school group has been in existence for up to three years. By controlling for school level fixed 
effects and trends in various ways we can observe how the degree of observable age-11 
sorting changes, as we progressively eliminate between-school variation at the primary and 
secondary school level. At the same time we can observe the changes in association between 
age-11 peer achievement and age-14 pupil achievement, and the implications of these two 
effects in age-11 to age-14 value-added specifications. All our methods lead us to the same 
conclusion: schoolmates’ prior achievement has no influence on individual achievement in 
simple linear-in-means specifications of peer effects. However, we show that this simple 
specification may mask significant costs to low-achievers and benefits from upper-mid 
ranking achievers from education amongst higher achieving schoolmates. 
Our methods innovate on previous peer-group studies that employ value-added or 
individual fixed effect regression models of pupil achievement. We show that these models 
are biased if old and new school groups have members in common, unless we partial out the 
strong correlation between a pupil’s own prior achievements and those of his or her prior 
schoolmates. Our data also has an advantage over existing studies in that it covers 80-90% of 
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the population of five pupil cohorts in 99% of state schools in the whole of England. The 
large sample sizes mean we have the scope to detect effects based on low within-group 
variance in peer-group quality and allow us to investigate various interesting types of 
heterogeneity in response. 
The next section provides an overview of recent relevant literature on the influence of 
peers on pupil achievement, outlining relevant methodological issues. Section 3 explains our 
empirical approach, our data and how it relates to the school system in England. Section 4 
presents and discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Background and literature 
The role of social interaction in modifying individual behaviour is central in many fields in 
social science and social psychologists have been conducting related experiments for half a 
century. Economists too have a long standing theoretical interest (Becker 1974), and the past 
two decades have seen rapid growth in applied work that has attempted to investigate both the 
existence and functional structure of peer group influence. The range of outcomes that have 
interested researchers is diverse, including smoking (Alexander et al. 2001; Ellickson, Bird et 
al. 2003), joke-telling (Angelone et al. 2005), sexual behaviour (Selvan et al. 2001) purchase 
of a retirement plan (Duflo and Saez 2000), fruit picking (Bandiera et al. 2005) check-out 
throughput (Moretti and Mas 2007), routine tasks (Falk and Ichino 2006) and performance in 
professional golf tournaments (Guryan et al. 2007). Introspection does suggest that many 
decisions are linked to similar decisions by a friend or other associate (in some cases fairly 
explicitly, like the decision to have sex, be in a gang or play tennis), and many consumption 
decisions rely on other consumers participating (e.g. video phones). However, the more 
interesting possibility is that group behaviour or attributes can modify individual actions in 
relation to important social and economic decisions that will affect their life chances – 
especially achievement in education. Some very bold claims have been made about the 
potency of peers in child development (Rich Harris 1999), yet the results of numerous studies 
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are very mixed, finding strong, weak or non-existent effects across a wide range of outcomes. 
This reflects the difficulty in defining the peer-group, isolating causal peer-group effects from 
other influences, lack of appropriate data, and different identification methodologies adopted 
by researchers. 
Most empirical work in economics refers to Manski’s (1993) framework which 
distinguishes between a) the influence of ‘contextual’ characteristics that members of a group 
bring with them when the group is formed, such as race, prior achievement, ability, gender; b) 
the influence of ‘endogenous’ behaviours that arise within the group such as inspiration, 
mimicry, effort, rivalry, competition for resources, and learning from others’ successes and 
mistakes.  In practical applications, this distinction usually boils down to treating group 
effects arising from observable group characteristics as contextual, and treating ‘endogenous’ 
effects as arising from unobservable group characteristics. However, statistical analysis in a 
non-experimental setting can only hope to make ‘causal’ statements about inter-relationships 
amongst observable factors. The best that can be done with regard to unobservables is to 
describe the patterns of association, since it is impossible to distinguish sorting and causal 
effects on unobservable dimensions without restrictive assumptions1. Hence, in this paper, we 
concern ourselves only with the effects of observable group characteristics, and in particular 
group prior achievement – seen here as a proxy for unobservable characteristics, such as the 
academic ability, prior motivation and effort. 
However, many, well-known and serious challenges remain. The primary challenge is of 
course that individuals generally choose the groups to which they belong, so peer-group 
characteristics and unobserved individual characteristics are likely to be correlated through 
sorting. A secondary challenge, is that there are conceptual and data-related problems in 
defining the ‘peer-group’ – is it the whole school, the child’s year group or class, or some 
narrower delineation requiring information on personal friendship networks (with even more 
                                                 
1 The same challenge faces research in spatial econometrics, see for example Lee (2007) 
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serious problems of endogenous group membership)? Thirdly, it is all too easy to specify 
empirical regression models of pupil achievement in a way that leads to misinterpretation. For 
example, conditional on group prior achievement, more favourable group background 
characteristics imply less past effort or lower group ability so the estimated effects of group 
characteristics may be downward biased (Cooley 2007). As we will show, similar problems 
arise from conditioning on individual prior achievement when the current peer group includes 
members in common with the peer group that gave rise to prior achievement. Lastly, there are 
many questions to ask about the way peer group characteristics are specified in regression 
models. The most popular “linear-in-means” specification – in which mean group 
characteristics enter linearly with a single parameter in models of individual outcomes – has 
come in for some criticism in terms of its empirical validity and policy relevance (Hoxby and 
Weingarth 2005). However, linear-in-means peer effects do have important consequences for 
equity (streaming or segregation exacerbates educational inequalities), even if they have no 
implications for efficiency (streaming or not makes no difference to aggregate outcomes), and 
so still seem worthy of attention. Even so, important non-linear effects and heterogeneity in 
response can be masked by focussing in homogenous, linear-in-means effects, although there 
are clear advantages in terms of simplicity of interpretation, presentation and possibilities for 
identification. Our responses to all these considerations are set out in Section 3. 
What does the econometric evidence on peer group effects tell us so far? The earliest 
studies on peer effects in educational attainment (Hanushek 1971, Summers and Wolfe 1977, 
Henderson et al. 1978) took relatively few steps towards overcoming problems of peer-group 
endogeneity. But recent studies have applied the standard set of modern econometric tools. 
Some have tried instrumental variables approaches, although it is very hard to find 
instruments that are plausibly uncorrelated with unobserved individual attributes or do not 
have direct effects (Dills 2005, Fertig 2003, Goux and Maurin 2005, Gaviria and Raphael 
2001, Robertson and Symons 2003). Several papers have sought random year-to-year 
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variation in mean peer group quality, occurring through ‘sampling’ variation as new cohorts 
are drawn from the population into schools, or as pupils move from one school to another. 
Variants of this approach appear in Hanushek et al. (2003), McEwan (2003), Lavy et al 
(2007), Vigdor and Nechyba (2004) and Hoxby (2000). Occasionally, opportunities arise for 
empirical analysis based on explicit randomisation, or assignment that appears random in the 
data, for example Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Cullen, Jacob et al. (2003), Vigdor 
and Nechyba (2004), Sanbonmatsu et al. (2004) and Hoxby and Weingarth (2005). But even 
empowered with these more sophisticated estimation methods and richer data than earlier 
studies, researchers are still divided on the importance of peer effects. It is worth 
emphasising, however, that even those studies that find statistically significant effects tend to 
find relatively small effects, as is clear in the summary presented in Error! Reference source 
not found.. Nearly all the estimates suggest that pupil achievement rises by less than 10% of 
one standard deviation for a one standard deviation rise in peer group quality (measured in 
terms of the between peer-group variance). The outliers tend to be studies based on IV 
approaches, and/or single cross-sections. Many of the studies investigate heterogeneity across 
pupil types and non-linearity in response, but almost every paper comes to different 
conclusions in this respect and we do not attempt to a summary here. 
In the next section, we outline and justify our empirical strategy for assessing whether 
pupils derive any benefit from the prior academic achievement of their schoolmates in 
England’s secondary schools. 
3 Empirical strategy and data 
Our core strategy has three key elements: 1) partially controlling for unobservable pupil 
characteristics using prior outcomes in a value added specification; 2) eliminating fixed over 
time school specific and school choice specific factors using fixed effects methods; 3) 
predicting peer group quality from the effectiveness of peers’ origin primary schools. 
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3.1 Group effects in value added models 
It is well understood that two processes can lead individuals to have similar achievements to 
the group in which they belong: a) causal effects that link group characteristics to individual 
outcomes b) sorting of similar individuals into groups. In the absence of explicit 
randomisation into groups, the key challenge in measuring peer group effects and 
neighbourhood effects of type a) is to distinguish them from sorting effects of type b). 
One naïve approach to this problem is to condition estimates of current period causal 
effects on pupil achievement at the beginning of the period, in order to try to eliminate 
unobserved individual effects and control for potential sorting along these individual lines. A 
typical example model of ‘linear-in-means’ group effects, for estimation by regression 
methods, might be: 
i i iy x x iρ β ω= + +%      (1) 
where iy  is current pupil academic achievement (e.g test scores), ix  is pupil prior 
achievement (seen here as a proxy for unobserved individual heterogeneity), ix%  is the mean 
of pupil i’s peers’ schoolmates achievements (e.g. prior test scores) and iω  represents 
unobservable factors that affect current achievement. Clearly, least squares estimation of this 
model can only yield consistent estimates of ‘causal’ peer influences on current achievement 
if the unobservable factors in current achievement ( iω ) are uncorrelated with prior 
achievement and school group prior achievement. 
For the moment, let us set aside concerns over sorting along unobservable lines which 
would lead iω  and ix%  to be correlated. Even then, the specification of (1) does not easily 
provide estimates of peer group influence that are easy to interpret, because the group to 
which  belongs in the current period may well have many members in common with the 
group to which they belonged in the previous period, and/or because these new and old school 
group achievements are correlated for other reasons. Thus, new and old peer group 
i
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components have very different linkages with current achievement iy , conditional on prior 
achievement ix , and it is necessary to separate out these different relationships empirically. 
To illustrate this point, consider a simple two period process giving rise to (1). For 
example where period 1 corresponds to primary schooling and period 2 corresponds to 
secondary schooling. At the end of primary school (period 1) individual child achievement 
( ,1ix ) is correlated with the mean primary school group achievement ( ,1ix% ), either through peer 
group influence, pupil sorting, or school and teaching quality effects that school group 
members experience in common: 
,1 1 ,1 ,1i ix x iλ ε= +%      (2) 
Next, school groups reform in secondary school, such that the mean prior achievement in 
a pupil’s new school group ( ,2ix% ) is correlated with mean prior achievement in the pupil’s 
primary school group ( ,1ix% ), because of observable sorting and because new and old school 
groups have members in common. 
,2 ,1 ,2i i ix x uθ= +% %      (3) 
Lastly, pupil achievement at the end of period 2 in secondary school depends on mean 
prior achievements of the new school group, and on unobservable pupil factors that are 
serially correlated with unobserved factors influencing pupil prior achievement in (1), mainly 
through unobserved individual heterogeneity ( ,1iε  , e.g. ability, family background). 
     ,2 2 ,2 ,1 ,2i i iy x ivλ ρε= + +%     (4) 
These equations together imply, the following relationships, derived via a standard Cochrane 
Orcutt transformation: 
( )
,2 ,1 2 ,2 1 ,1 ,2
,1 2 ,2 1 ,1 ,2
1 1
,1 2 ,2 ,2 ,2
i i i i i
i i i i
i i
y x x x v
x u x v
i ix x u v
ρ λ ρλ
ρ λ ρλ θ
ρλ λ ρρ λ θ θ
= + − +
= + − − +
⎛ ⎞= + − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
% %
%
%
  (5a, 5b, 5c) 
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Hence from (5c), consistent estimation of the parameter β  in (1) yields a consistent estimate 
of ( )2 1λ ρλ θ− , not the ‘structural’ peer group parameter 2λ . Moreover, ordinary least 
squares estimates will be a weighted average of 2λ and ( )2 1λ ρλ θ− , that depends on the 
variance share of innovations  in new peer group quality (5b),2iu
2, where  represents 
components of new peer group composition that are uncorrelated with old peer group 
composition. The intuition here is that low ability (
,2iu
,1iε ) pupils come from relatively high 
scoring school groups, and high ability ( ,1iε ) pupils come from relatively low scoring school 
groups, conditional on the pupil’s own ability. If new and old peer group composition is 
closely related through sorting or through common membership, then this relationship is 
transmitted through to estimates of new peer group influence, conditional on pupil prior 
achievements. 
Two alternative options for estimation present themselves from (5a,b,c). Firstly, we 
could use information on new peer group composition ( ,2ix% ) and information on old peer 
group composition ( ,1ix% ) to estimate Equation (5a) directly. Note that this is a more general 
version of the individual fixed effect estimator in first differences 
( ),2 ,1 ,1 ,0 ,2i i i i ix x x xλ= + − +% % v , in which 1ρ =  and 1 2λ λ λ= = , but allows for mean reversion. 
Clearly, the fixed effects model is inappropriate, even if the restriction 1ρ =  is valid, because 
this model imposes 1 2λ λ=  and yet 1λ  represents all group effects in period 1 (sorting, 
unobserved common influences, peer group effects), whereas 2λ  represents causal peer 
influence only. 
                                                 
2 It is also well known (Todd and Wolpin 2003) that value-added models of this type will be biased if prior 
achievement is a poor proxy for serially correlated ‘ability’ components, that is if (2) contains an additional noise 
term on the right hand side. 
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Secondly, we could use information on exogenous innovations to peer group quality 
( ) with which to identify ,2iu 2λ  in equation (5b), for example by estimating the regression: 
,2 ,1 2 ,2 ,2i i iy x x iρ λ ζ= + +%%     (6) 
in which ,2ix%%  is defined as the mean prior achievements of new schoolmates who were not 
members of pupil i’s school group in primary school period 1. Note that if sorting into school 
groups is random in the sense that mean achievement in the old peer group ( ,1ix% ) and 
achievement of new peer group members ( , and hence ,2iu ,2ix%% ) are uncorrelated, then (5a) and 
(6) both yield consistent estimates of 2λ . This provides one basis for testing whether old and 
new school group composition is linked purely through common group membership, or 
whether sorting drives the correlation between the achievements of old and new group 
members. 
The value-added approach in itself is clearly of little use if there is low inter-school 
mobility and a pupil’s school group in period 2 is very similar to their school group in period 
1. In this case, the contribution of the period 2 school group to period 2 pupil achievement 
cannot be separately identified from the association between period 1 school group with 
period 1 pupil achievement. Our study circumvents this low-mobility problem by exploiting 
the major changes to school group composition that occur when a child makes the transition 
from primary to secondary schooling in England. We consider peer group influences just after 
the point when pupils make this transition at age 11. A significant advantage of using this 
compulsory transition over, say, voluntary mobility between schools over time, is that the 
choice to move is not dependent on pupil characteristics and our estimates are not weighted in 
favour of high-mobility schools or pupils. 
As will be discussed in Section 3.4, children in England sit tests at age 10-11 in May at 
the end of primary school, then move on to secondary school in September of the same year. 
Only a small proportion of a child’s new secondary school peer group is made up of members 
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in common with their primary school peer group (16% on average), so there is a major 
innovation to peer group quality driven by children coming from primary schools other than 
the child’s own.  Our first objective therefore, in line with the discussion above and equation 
(5c), is to see whether school group prior achievements influence a child’s progress over the 
first three years of secondary schooling to age 14, conditional on the child’s own age-11 
achievements and those of his or her age-11 primary schoolmates. We can, in the spirit of 
equation (6), also look directly at whether age-14 achievement is linked to the mean age-11 
achievements of schoolmates arriving at secondary school from primary schools other than a 
pupil’s own. 
In summary, we provide as the first component of our empirical analysis, estimates of 
equation (5a) and (6) using age-11 achievements as measures of ,1ix , ,1ix% , ,2ix% , ,2ix%% , and age-
14 achievements as measures of . We estimate these regressions with and without basic 
controls for observable pupil characteristics. In parallel, we will also present regressions of 
age 11 achievement on secondary peer group prior achievement, and regressions of age-14 
achievement on secondary school peer group achievement, without controls for prior 
achievement. These estimates are potentially highly informative about the magnitude of 
sorting into school groups that occurs along lines of prior achievement, and, in turn, the likely 
contribution this sorting makes to any observed correlation between age-14 achievements and 
the prior age-11 achievements of a pupil’s schoolmates. For instance, if we observe that a 
pupil’s secondary school group’s mean age-11 achievement is just as closely linked to his or 
her age-11 achievement as his or her age-14 achievement, we would find it hard to defend an 
argument that peer and individual outcomes were linked through peer group influence in 
secondary school rather then simply through sorting along lines of age-11 achievement. We 
will also generalise our specifications to allow for non-linearities and heterogeneity in 
individual responses to peer group quality to see if the linear-in-means representations is too 
restrictive. 
,2iy
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Of course, sorting is also likely to occur on the basis of unobservable pupil 
characteristics, and we are not suggesting that the value-added specification outline above can 
alone identify causal peer-group influence at the school level. We need to augment these 
specifications to allow for the fact that the unobservable components in (5) and (6) are likely 
to be correlated with peer group quality through choice of school. 
3.2 Group effects in group fixed effect models 
In England, the decisions over which primary school and which secondary school to attend 
are to some extent voluntary, because the admissions system effectively allows a restricted 
choice amongst local schools, as detailed in Section 3.4. So, the problem of sorting into 
secondary schools along unobservable lines is possibly very acute. The value-added approach 
outlined above does not alone address the more general problem that the unobservable factors 
in the value-added model ( ) may be correlated with mean group characteristics through 
school choice. For instance, the most motivated children (or parents) may seek secondary 
school groups with high prior achievement (
,2iv
,2ix% ). 
One standard strategy for eliminating sorting of this type is to assume that sorting occurs 
at some larger group level, but that within this group, there is no sorting of individuals into 
sub groups. This argument implies a group fixed effect specification, an approach that has 
become quite common in the literature (e.g. Hanushek et al 2003, Vigdor and Nechyba 2005, 
Ding and Lehrer 2006, Ammemmueller and Pishke 2006, Lavy et al 2007). One ‘sub-group’ 
fixed effect strategy of this type involves assignment into classes within schools, on the 
assumption that there is sorting into schools but not into classes within schools. However 
secondary class assignment is often explicitly non-random because there is within school 
tracking, and pupils are not always taught in the same classes. For example, Rothstein (2007) 
shows that within-school fixed effects strategies based on cross-sectional data are ineffective 
at eliminating biases in estimated teacher effects, so are equally unlikely to be effective at 
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estimating peer group effects. In any case, we do not have data on class assignments in 
England and pupils mix with different sets of pupils for classes in different subjects. It is more 
plausible perhaps that variation in school group quality over time, within schools, is random 
(e.g. Hanushek et al. 2003) and that children cannot choose schools on the basis of the 
expected innovation in peer group quality in a given year. It is this line of argument that we 
will follow.   
Since pupils are changing school, we need to control for school influences on prior 
achievement at both the primary and secondary level. Moreover, for fixed effects approaches 
to work, the data must provide substantial variation in sub-group composition within fixed-
effects groups that is not driven mechanically by an individual pupil’s own group 
membership3. Our data allows us to observe 5 cohorts of age 14 children in England who 
made this primary-secondary transition between 1999-2004, so we can control carefully for 
fixed effects at school level whilst allowing for substantial variation in peer group quality 
within schools over time. Our specifications therefore allow: first, for fixed effects for 
primary school, and then for primary × secondary school group. In the first case, we measure 
the effects of school peer groups using variation in the composition of secondary group 
experienced by pupils who make transitions from the same primary school to different 
secondary schools. This approach does not, however, effectively control for sorting into 
secondary schools conditional on primary school choice. So, in the second case we identify 
the effects of peer groups using variation over time in the composition of secondary peer 
group within the same pair of primary and secondary schools in different years. We, thus, 
control for primary and secondary school characteristics that are fixed over time for the 
duration of our sample, and control for unobserved pupil and family background 
characteristics that are common to specific school pair choices. 
                                                 
3 For example, if there is only one sub-group per school fixed effects group, then variation in peer-group 
achievement is perfectly negatively correlated with individual achievement conditional on school fixed effects 
(e.g. Ding and Lehrer 2006, Lee 2007) 
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3.3 Origin primary school as a driver of peer group quality 
We will show, through various falsification tests, that even this stringent fixed effect approach 
is not on its own sufficient to eliminate sorting into schools on the basis of observable 
measures of prior attainment at age-11. However we argue, and demonstrate empirically, that 
pupils do not sort into secondary schools on the basis of the primary school effectiveness of 
their secondary school peers, once we consider changes over time within the same primary-
secondary school combination. In other words, pupils making a given primary-secondary 
school transition in different years experience secondary peers coming from different primary 
schools. Therefore, the composition of the secondary school peer group changes in terms of 
the combination of primary schools from which the pupils originate. This variation in peer 
group quality arises because of random cohort-to-cohort changes in the secondary school 
intake, in terms of the quality of primary schools from which pupils originate. This variation 
in primary school quality provides us with an observable component of  in Equation 5b, 
with which we might hope to identify causal group effects. 
,2iu
Clearly, for this purpose, we need an estimate of primary school quality or 
‘effectiveness’ that is not correlated with a pupil’s own unobservable education-related 
attributes. We measure this school effectiveness using pupils’ average gain in attainment 
between ages 7 and 11 at each primary school on an auxiliary data set of age-11 primary 
school pupils matched to their age 7 test scores. More precisely, we regress pupils’ primary 
school age 11 test scores on pupils’ age 7 tests, with controls for pupil characteristics, and 
compute the fixed primary school effects from these regressions. Importantly, whilst we use 
the cohorts aged 14 in 2002-2006 for estimating our main peer effects equation, we use 
different cohorts aged 11 in these years to construct our measures of primary school 
effectiveness. Averaging these primary school fixed effects amongst secondary school peer 
groups provides an estimate of the mean primary school quality of a pupil’s secondary school 
peers. We show that this source of variation in peer group quality is uncorrelated with 
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individual pupil characteristics, conditional on primary x secondary school fixed effects, and 
so provides us with a potential source of identification in reduced form models4. 
3.4 England’s school context, and the sources of data 
Compulsory education in state schools in England is organised into five “Key Stages”. The 
Primary phase, from ages 4-11 spans the Foundation Stage to Key Stage 2. At the end of Key 
Stage 2, when pupils are 10-11, children leave the Primary phase and go on to Secondary 
school where they progress through to Key Stage 3 at age 14, and to Key Stage 4 at age 16. At 
the end of each Key Stage, prior to age-16, pupils are assessed on the basis of standard 
national tests. 
The UK’s Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) collects a variety of 
data on state-school pupils centrally, because the pupil assessment system is used to publish 
school performance tables and because information on pupil numbers and characteristics is 
necessary for administrative purposes – in particular to determine funding. A National Pupil 
Database holds information on each pupil’s assessment record in the Key Stage Assessments 
throughout their school career since 1996. Assessments at Key Stages 2 and 3 (ages 11 and 
14) include a test-based component and teacher assessment component for three core 
curriculum areas: maths, science and English. We work with the overall test score in these 
subjects, and convert the score into percentiles of the pupil distribution within our estimation 
sample. This is because we found that there are few differences between the subjects in our 
analysis. All our results are therefore about effects on pupil ranking within the national 
distribution of school achievement5. 
                                                 
4 We could of course use this variation in primary school quality as an instrument for secondary 
schoolmates’ prior achievement, but there is little advantage in this approach over a reduced-form specification. 
5 A complication arises in that the maths and science tests at age 14 are structured into tiers, with pupils 
sitting different tests according to their abilities. This means that the scores for different pupils are not directly 
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Since 2002, a Pupil Level Annual Census (PLASC) records information on pupil’s 
school, gender, age, ethnicity, language skills, any special educational needs or disabilities, 
entitlement to free school meals and various other pieces of information including postcode of 
residence (a postcode is typically 10-12 neighbouring addresses). PLASC is integrated with 
the pupil’s assessment record (described above) in the National Pupil Database (NPD), giving 
a large and detailed dataset on pupils along with their test histories. 
From these sources we derive an extract that follows five cohorts of children from their 
Key Stage 2 test score results at age 11, to their Key Stage 3 results at age 14 in 2002-2006. In 
addition, for two cohorts aged 14 in 2005 and 2006 we have information on their academic 
achievement in the Key Stage 1 tests at age 7. Various other data sources can be merged in at 
school level, including institutional characteristics (from the DCSF). We also focus solely on 
the 92% of state-school pupils who are in Comprehensive schools that do not choose pupils 
on the basis of academic ability, since problems of selection on unobservable factors are 
undoubtedly more acute in the non-Comprehensive sector. Also, we do not have data on the 
6-7% of pupils who attend private schools. This large and complex combined data set 
provides us with information on around 2 million children aged 14 for the period 2002-2006. 
Using this dataset we create own-achievement measures at ages 11 and 14, and calculate 
a pupil’s school peer group achievement at age 11 and at age 7, based on pupils in the pupil’s 
own cohort. The school age-cohort provides an appropriate peer group definition because 
pupils are not taught in the same groups for all lessons and so mix with pupils from 
throughout their age-cohort. Many schools place pupils into classes according to their subject-
specific abilities. For our instrumentation strategy, we use the same data sources to derive the 
                                                                                                                                                        
comparable. However, pupils are assigned to non-overlapping achievement Levels using the test results, based 
on annual rules devised by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority. Using the information on Level 
achieved, test tier and test score we rank pupils within the Level they achieved and so recover their overall 
position in the achievement distribution. 
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average pupil age 7 to 11 value added for every primary school in England, based on five 
cohorts of children aged 11 from 2002-2006.  
4 Results 
4.1 Description of the key variables 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our main estimation sample. All the central 
results in the paper are based on a pupils’ percentile rankings in national tests at age 11 
(primary school) and 14 (three years into secondary school), that is we convert mean pupil 
test sores in maths, science and English at these ages into percentiles. We found that there 
were few interesting differences between subjects in our main analysis, so we use a pupil’s 
percentile based on their average percentile in all three subjects. Hence, the summary statistics 
on pupil attainment at ages 11 and 14 in Rows 1 and 2 are not particularly interesting: by 
construction, they have a mean of approximately 50.5 and a standard deviation of about 28.8. 
The standard deviations for the peer group means in the next rows are more revealing, and 
show that there is substantial variation in the composition of school groups in England, 
measured in terms of the pupils’ mean prior achievements. 
Our regression specifications will use the peer group defined in a number of different 
ways, but we focus (for reasons outlined in 3) on peer group of pupil i defined by secondary 
schoolmates who originated from a different primary school from pupil i at age 11. Based on 
this definition, the standard deviation of peer-group mean test score percentiles in Row 3 is 
30% of the standard deviation in the distribution across pupils, at just over 8.6 percentiles (i.e. 
9% the variance is between groups). 
However, since we will be using regression models with fixed effects we also show the 
within-group variation in this peer test score variable in Rows 5 and 6, first within primary 
school groups, then within primary × secondary school groups. The first of these figures tells 
us that the standard deviation in secondary school peer quality experienced by pupils from the 
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same primary school but going to different secondary schools or the same secondary school in 
different years is 5.3 percentiles, accounting for about 3.4% of the overall peer group 
variance. The next figure shows a standard deviation of 2.9 percentiles once we restrict 
attention to variation in peer groups over time and consider only changes in secondary peer 
group experienced by pupils making the same primary-secondary transition in different years. 
This variance is about 1% of the total variance in peer groups across and within schools. For 
comparison, we also show the figures for all secondary school peers in the same year group 
(irrespective of primary school, Row 6). The standard deviation for the ‘all-pupils’ peer group 
mean is marginally less than for peers from primary schools other than the pupil’s own, as we 
would expect because the group size is slightly higher. 
In the next rows of the table we show the variation in secondary school peer group based 
on the current ‘value-added’-based effectiveness of the primary schools from which pupils 
originate. The estimates of primary school quality are based on ‘point scores’ that measure 
progress between ages 7 and 11 and are scaled in terms of the expected point gain for baseline 
white, non-free meal entitled, English first language girls aged 11 over the pupil census years. 
As explained in Section 3.3, these estimates are the primary school fixed effects from 
auxiliary pupil-level value-added regressions for progress between ages 7 and 11. In the 
average primary school, baseline pupils progress by about 13.8 points between ages 7 and 11, 
and the standard deviation across primary schools is 0.88 points. If we look at the variation 
across secondary school peer groups in terms of origin primary school quality, the standard 
deviation is about half that at 0.43 points. Hence, around 23% of the variance in primary 
school quality is represented in the variance between secondary school peer groups. In the 
next two rows we show the within-group variation when peer group quality is measured in 
terms of pupils’ origin primary school effectiveness: the variation between secondary schools, 
within primary school groups, accounts for 4.7% of the total peer-group variance (a standard 
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deviation of 0.192), whilst pure variation over time within primary × secondary groups 
accounts is only 0.66% of the total variance (with a standard deviation of 0.075)6.  
The group sizes are reported in the last rows of Table 2. On average, there are around 
184 pupils in a secondary school age cohort and around 84% of this school group is made up 
of pupils who come from a primary school other than a pupil’s own school at age 11. The 
large group sizes mean that any purely random variation in group composition, in the absence 
of sorting, is going to generate quite a low variance in mean group characteristics. Inevitably 
then, much of the variation in peer group quality in school is produced by sorting of pupils 
across schools. However, we will show in what follows that the residual peer group variance 
is sufficient to allow precise estimation of relationships of interest precisely in our large pupil 
population census.  
4.2 Regression estimates of linear-in-means peer group effects 
We now turn to basic regression estimates of the links between pupil test score outcomes and 
their peer group quality. Our presentation in Table 3 is structured to show transparently the 
links between pupil and group age-11 test scores under various specifications. Each cell in the 
table is the coefficient of interest from a separate regression of pupil test scores on group tests 
scores. 
The first group of three columns are simple Ordinary Least Squares estimates. Firstly, in 
Column 1, we show to what extent a pupil’s age-11 test scores from primary school are 
correlated with the mean age-11 test scores of their secondary school peers. This association 
can arise through sorting, or because the secondary school peer group contains members of 
the pupil’s primary school peer group who may have influenced age-11 test scores or been 
subject to common primary school specific factors such as teaching quality. These estimates 
                                                 
6 Note that this is almost exactly what we would expect if all variation is random and groups were of equal 
size at the sample mean of 154, because 1/154 = 0.65%. 
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are shown in the top panel without any additional pupil control variables and again in the 
bottom panel with control variables (gender, ethnicity, language and free meal entitlement, 
school type, year dummies). In Column 2, we next show to what extent pupil’s age-14 test 
scores in secondary school are correlated with mean age-11 test scores of their secondary 
school peers. Again, this relationship could exist through sorting into secondary school or 
because of peer group influences or common unobserved factors at primary or secondary 
school level. Finally, in Column 3 we show to what extent the gain in scores at age 14 
exceeds the gain in scores at age 11 in value-added models as a first step to gauging the 
relative roles of sorting versus peer group effects. 
Moving down the rows in each panel we explore how our Ordinary Least Squares 
estimates change as we vary the peer group definition for pupil i. Firstly, in Rows 1 and 4 we 
use prior achievement of all secondary peers in the same year group (equation (5c) in Section 
3.1). Next in Rows 2 and 5 we condition on the prior achievement of children from a pupil’s 
own primary school (equation (5a) in Section 3.1). Lastly in Rows 3 and 6 we use only the 
prior achievement of children who are from primary schools other than the pupil’s own 
(equation (6) in Section 3.1). To repeat what we said in Section 3.1, the rationale behind this 
exercise is that estimates of peer group effects are potentially downward biased in value-
added educational models unless we can condition out the influence of peers who impact on 
prior attainment at age 11. 
This structure is then repeated in Columns 4-6 with the inclusion of primary school fixed 
effects and then in Columns 7-9 with the inclusion of primary × secondary school fixed 
effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects reduces the potential correlation between 
individual and group outcomes caused by sorting on unobservable group characteristics that 
are correlated with prior achievement. 
We describe the general patterns observable in Table 3. Firstly, it is clear from the 
Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the correlation between pupil’s primary age-11 tests and 
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secondary school peers’ age-11 tests that there is strong general sorting into secondary 
schools7. These coefficients in Column 1 will also pick up spatial autocorrelations arising 
from common local geographical factors and the fact that a proportion of a pupil’s secondary 
school peers came from his or her own primary school. The coefficient is 0.94 in the 
regressions without control variables: i.e a pupil at the kth percentile in the distribution of age-
11 primary school test scores can expect to be amongst other pupils who are on average at the 
0.94×kth percentile in this distribution when they get to secondary school. The ‘sorting’ 
coefficients are lower when we control for prior achievement in the pupil’s origin primary 
school group (Rows 2, 5) or when we consider the association with prior achievement of 
pupils originating only in other primary schools (Rows 3, 6). 
Looking at the OLS age-14 test results in Column 2 reveals that the association between 
pupil test scores at age 14 and group prior achievement is amplified relative to what was 
observed on entry at age 11 in Column 1. Thus, pupils entering secondary schools alongside 
higher achieving pupils do tend to move up the distribution of achievement relative to pupils 
entering schools alongside lower-achievers. This could be due to peer group effects, sorting 
on unobserved factors that affect pupil progress, or simply due to common secondary group 
influences such as teaching quality or resources that affect age 14 achievement and are 
correlated with pupils’ mean age-11 scores. The same feature of the data is shown more 
explicitly in Column 3, where the OLS estimates of the value-added specification suggest that 
a one-percentile increase in school mean age-11 test scores is associated with a 0.26-0.43 
percentile improvement in pupil’s own scores at age 14. Of course, these would be very naïve 
estimates of causal peer group effects and we will continue to more stringent specifications. 
Note first, that the coefficients in Column 3 reveal exactly the pattern expected from our 
discussion of value-added models in Section 3.1: the coefficient estimate increases as we 
control for the fact that high-age-11-test-score pupils come from high-age-11-test-score 
                                                 
7 This is evident in the persistent stratification described in Gibbons and Telhaj (2007) 
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primary school groups, and that their secondary school peer group has members in common 
with their primary school group. This pattern of increasing coefficients is repeated in all the 
value added models in Columns 3, 6 and 9 as we move across the table. 
In Columns 3-6 we repeat the estimates with primary school fixed effects8. This 
eliminates fixed-over-time primary school factors, general geographical factors and pupil 
factors linked to primary school choice. However, it is clear from the ‘sorting’ models of age-
11 test scores in Rows 1 and 3 that observable sorting is not eliminated: a high-age-11-ability 
pupil is more likely to find his/her way to a secondary school with other higher age-11-ability 
pupils than is a low-age-11-ability pupil from the same primary school. We therefore doubt 
whether sorting on unobservables is eliminated, so again the effects on attainment at age-14 
cannot reliably be interpreted as causal. Note, however, that controlling for primary school 
fixed effects alone reduces substantially the association between pupil age 11 to 14 ‘value-
added’ and peer group age-11 ability: a one percentile improvement in peer group ability is 
linked to just 0.2 of a percentile improvement in age-14 test scores, and only 0.16-0.18 
percentiles once we control for pupil characteristics. This implies that a one-standard 
deviation change in peer group ability is linked to just 5-6% of one standard deviation 
improvement in age-14 test scores (conditional on age-11 tests). 
Finally, in Columns 7-9 we eliminate all purely cross-sectional sorting by controlling for 
primary × secondary fixed effects. Still, in Column 7, we find evidence of observable sorting 
within primary-secondary groups over time. This is quite a puzzling finding, since it is hard to 
imagine how pupils can anticipate how the peer groups in their specific year-group in a 
particular secondary school will differ from the mean peer group in that secondary school 
over time. One possibility is just that there are unobserved primary  × secondary trends in 
                                                 
8 Similar to a specification used in an earlier version of this paper where we had only two time periods Gibbons 
and Telhaj (2006), and with very similar results. 
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peer group quality (e.g. if some secondary schools are becoming increasingly lax or restrictive 
in terms of their admission procedures), a possibility that we investigate in the next section. 
In any case, looking across the Columns 6-9 in the table, we see that the coefficient in the 
age-14 test score models with primary × secondary effects is nearly identical to the coefficient 
in the age-11 test score models once we adopt our preferred group definitions. A one 
percentile increase in the mean age-11 test achievement of secondary peers from other 
primary schools is associated with a 0.12-0.14 percentile increase in pupil’s own achievement 
at both age 11 and age 14. Hence, the estimated peer group effect on pupil progress in the 
value added models (Column 9) is effectively zero, even when there is a small degree of 
sorting on prior age-11 achievement. 
A few notes are in order at this point. Firstly, note that amplified noise through over 
zealous use of fixed effects is not to blame for our zero coefficients with primary × secondary 
fixed effects: the coefficients in the age-11 and age-14 achievement level models are precisely 
measured. The zero coefficient in the value-added model results from the coefficients on age-
11 and age-14 test scores being almost equal. Note also, the importance of separating out the 
effect of peers originating from own and other primary schools. If we apply the standard peer 
group definition based on all secondary school peers (Column 7), the value added models 
yield strongly negative (and significant) coefficients on peer group quality as implied by 
Equation (5c). Again, note that although we have not eliminated sorting on the basis of age-11 
test scores, the equality of the parameter estimates with and without controls (bottom versus 
top panels) shows that the primary × secondary school fixed effects control effectively for 
sorting along other observable dimensions, at least in so far as these characteristics are 
pertinent to test scores. Moreover, note that our results are not sensitive to transient noise in 
pupils’ individual age-11 test scores, for which the coefficient (unreported in the tables, ρ in 
Equation (6)) is around 0.87. We can instrument these scores with age-7 test achievements (as 
suggested in Todd and Wolpin 2003) or by teacher predictions of pupil achievement at age 11 
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and the main findings on peer group influence remain largely unchanged, although the 
estimate of ρ increases by about 10%. In fact we can constrain ρ to 1 with almost identical 
results. Lastly, note also that it makes very little difference in our value added models whether 
we measure school group quality in terms of all secondary school peers, conditional on own 
primary school peers, or whether we consider only peers originating in other primary schools. 
As discussed in the context of Equation (6) in Section 3.1, this provides some reassurance 
that, conditional on appropriate school fixed effects, primary-secondary school transition 
provides innovations to a pupil’s peer group quality that are uncorrelated with the mean age-
11 achievement of his or her own primary school peers. In the results and robustness checks 
that follow, we will simplify the analysis by considering only innovations to a pupil’s school 
peer group induced by schoolmates originating from other primary schools (i.e. in line with 
the specifications in Rows 3 and 6 of Table 3 and Equation (6) in Section 3.1. 
4.3 Unobserved trends  
In Table 4 we go further to see if we can eliminate sorting by controlling more precisely for 
geographical location or for differential trends across schools. Firstly in Row 1 Columns 1-3 
we control for primary × secondary × postcode-of-residence fixed effects, to allow for the fact 
that children may be sorted into secondary schools based on where they live, even conditional 
on which primary school they attend. Next, in Columns 4-6 we estimate models in which the 
primary × secondary trends in test scores (age 11 or age 14 as appropriate) are included in the 
regressions as additional control variables. We obtain these trends by estimating 599987 
auxiliary regressions of test scores on time trends for each  primary × secondary group in our 
data9. Although the degree of observable sorting in terms of age-11 test scores is reduced 
once we control for trends, the coefficient on age-14 test scores falls in tandem, so again we 
                                                 
9 Other methods, such as partialing out the time trends from peer group mean test scores produce similar 
results. 
 - 24 -
find no peer group effects in our value-added models. Next, in Rows 7-9 we put the secondary 
school peer group in adjacent cohorts – i.e. the mean age-11 test scores of those who are in 
year groups (grades) one year above and one year below pupil i – alongside their own age-14 
year-group peer variable (a similar method is applied in Lavy et al 2007). Looking at the 
coefficients for the age-11 test score sorting models in Column 1 we can see that there is 
some sorting on the basis of adjacent cohorts’ age-11 test scores (we can think of these as 
proxies for short run expected secondary school quality), but controlling for this sorting does 
not change our key finding: the prior academic achievements of same-grade peers has no 
impact on pupil progress in linear-in-means models. 
4.4 Primary schools as sources of variation in peer group quality 
In Table 5 we use an alternative measure of peer group quality based on the mean age-7 to 
age-11 value-added of the primary schools from which peers originate. The rationale for this 
approach is set out in Section 3.3: part of the reason peer groups differ over time within 
primary × secondary groups is that the group composition changes in terms of the quality mix 
of origin primary schools, and we argue that it is unlikely that sorting can occur on the basis 
this variation. Therefore, we can use estimates of long-run value-added in origin primary 
schools as an exogenous measure of peer group quality. 
Firstly, Column 1 of Table 5 confirms that origin primary school value-added is indeed a 
good predictor of the age-14 peer groups’ mean age-11 test score ranking: a one point 
increase in the mean value-added score of peer’s origin primary schools leads to a 4 percentile 
increase in the mean pupil ranking in the age-11 test score distribution10. Next, Column 2 
confirms too there is almost no sorting on the basis of pupils’ origin school value added: a 
pupil’s own age 11 tests are uncorrelated with the average quality of his or her secondary 
                                                 
10 Remember, the primary school value added scores are computed from pupils aged-11 at the time the peer 
group is aged 14. 
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school peers’ origin primary schools in these models with primary × secondary school fixed 
effects11. However, there is also no correlation between peer group quality and age-14 tests in 
Column 3, and the effect of peer group quality in the linear-in-means value added models in 
Row 4 remains stubbornly at zero. 
4.5 Nonlinear effects, complementarities and alternative peer group characteristics 
In summary, our most rigorous specification implies that peer group quality in secondary 
school – measured in terms of prior academic achievements or the primary school quality of 
peers – has no impact on an individual pupil’s academic progress in secondary school 
between ages 11 and 14. The link between pupil and peers academic achievement at age 14 is 
driven purely by sorting into secondary school groups, and this sorting is observable in age-11 
test scores. 
Perhaps, one reason why we find no effect from peers is that we have been too restrictive 
in terms of our linear-in-means specification of peer group effects. Our findings could mask 
important non-linearities in the response to peer group quality, or complementarities between 
a pupil’s own ability and that of their peers. Alternatively, perhaps we are just looking at the 
wrong peer group attribute, and it is actually demographic characteristics such as low income, 
gender or ethnicity that matter. We now consider these matters in detail. 
Table 6 addresses the non-linearity/complementarity issue by re-estimating our preferred 
value added, fixed effects specification but with dummies for own age-11 test quintiles, 
dummies for each quintile in the mean peer age-11-achievement distribution, and their 
interactions. The dummies are structured such that the coefficients indicate the marginal effect 
of peer group improvement within own-achievement quintile, as we read left right across the 
                                                 
11 Note that the scaling of the coefficients in Column 5 differs from the other columns in the Table. If the 
standard deviation in peer group quality in column 5 is scaled to have the same standard deviation as in Columns 
1-4,  then the coefficient in Row 1 is 0.028 (0.020)  
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table. For simplicity, we do not report the marginal effects of own prior achievement, which 
are obviously always large and highly statistically significant. The specifications also include 
interactions between own prior achievement quintile and a linear term in own prior 
achievement and the usual control variables. 
Moving across the columns, towards higher ability peer groups it is hard to spot any clear 
signs of significant or marked nonlinearities, although there is strong evidence of interaction 
between own ability and peers ability. For the lowest age-11 ability pupils, peer group quality 
improvements appear to have a significant adverse effect on outcomes at age 14. The loss in 
moving from the ‘worst’ to the ‘best’ peer group amounts to only about 2.3 percentiles in the 
age-14 pupil distribution. This finding is somewhat reminiscent of the idea of ‘relative 
deprivation’ effects in the neighbourhood effects literature, whereby outcomes for 
disadvantaged individuals are made worse by others’ success. Peer group quality has almost 
no influence on the 2nd ability quintile. However, age-14 attainment rises with peer group 
quality for pupils in the 3nd and 4th ability quintiles, by around 1.7-1.8 percentiles. For pupils 
in the top quintile of prior achievement, peer group prior achievement again has small overall 
negative impact of around 0.7 percentiles though the marginal effects are not significant at the 
1% level.  
Table 7 specifies complementarities between peers and individuals in a different way, 
and estimates the effect of adding more pupils in a specific achievement quintile to each 
pupil’s peer group. The table presents results from a regression in which we interact 
indicators of pupil’s own age-11 achievement quintile with the proportion of his or her school 
peers in other age 11 achievement quintiles. Note, we always omit the proportion of the peer 
group in the pupil’s own same achievement quintile. As before, we control for interactions 
between own prior achievement quintile and a linear term in own prior achievement, plus the 
usual characteristics. The general picture is very similar to that of Table 6, and shows lowest 
achieving pupils losing out significantly as the proportions of higher achieving peers 
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increases. A 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of peers in the top quintile is 
associated with an 0.86 percentile fall in the age-14 achievement of pupils in the lowest 
quintile. There are modest gains for pupils in the quintiles 2 and 3 from mixing with high 
achieving peers, and pupils in quintile 4 lose out from mixing with lower achieving peers. As 
seen before, high achieving pupils seem to benefit if their school is otherwise populated with 
low-achievers, although the coefficients are not highly statistically significant. It is also 
possible to test for sorting within each quintile of the pupil age-11 achievement distribution, 
by regressing pupil age-11 test scores on the proportions of his or her school peers in other 
age 11 achievement quintiles (controlling for primary × secondary fixed effects and the usual 
variables). The F-tests on the peer group quintile shares suggest that the peer group age-11 
quintile shares are unrelated to a pupil’s own achievement within own-achievement quintiles 
(p-values between 0.10 and 0.90), for all achievement groups except the lowest quintile. In 
this group, own age-11 achievement is positively correlated with the proportion of peers in all 
higher quintiles, suggesting positive sorting, which makes the negative influence of higher 
achieving peers all the more surprising. 
The analysis of Table 6 and Table 7 shows evidence of peer group effects, with some 
significant complementarities between own and peer ability. Where gains exist, they tend to 
be concentrated in the upper-middle part of the distribution, and there are negative effects on 
lower-achieving pupils from mixing with high-achievers, but moderate gains to high-
achievers from mixing with low-achievers. Any advantages and disadvantages of peer groups 
tend to cancel out over the entire distribution of pupil ability which is why the general effects 
captured by the linear-in-means specifications are zero. These complementary effects are 
substantial for the lowest ability pupils: the overall standard deviation of the proportion of 
peers in the top quintile is 0.40, and the standard deviation of age-11 scores for bottom 
quintile pupils is 12.13. Hence, a one-standard deviation increase in the proportion of high 
achievers in their peer group is linked to a 23% of one standard deviation decrease in the 
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achievement of the lowest achievers. For the middle quintile of pupils, the gain in age-14 
scores from a one standard deviation increase in the peer group share of the top is 15% of one 
standard deviation. The loss to pupils in the top quintile from a one standard deviation fall in 
the proportion of peers in the top quintile would amount to 7% of one standard deviation 
(assuming that the bottom for quintile shares increased by 10 percentage points each). 
Turning now to other ‘contextual’ peer group attributes, Table 8 reports comparable 
value-added models with primary × secondary fixed effects, that include mean peer group 
demographic and socioeconomic attributes entered together in the regressions. As usual in our 
specifications, these are the attributes of a pupil’s peers joining secondary school from 
primary schools other than that pupil’s own primary school. We also split the sample by 
demographic groups (gender, free meal entitlement, age) to check for interactions and 
complementarities. For the most part, the coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, 
even when tested in groups, and there are very few notable differences across the different 
pupil categories. The only clear exception is the effect of the proportion of the peer group 
who speak English as a first language. There is evidence here that being in a school group 
with a higher proportion of native English speakers confers some advantages in terms of age-
14 achievement. 
Why the language skills of peers should matter at this age is unclear, since most of those 
pupils without English as their first language will be fluent speakers by the time they reach 
secondary schooling. Moreover, pupils with English as an additional language actually show 
higher value-added progress between ages 11 and 14 than native English speakers (the 
coefficient on English first language in our regressions is around -2.5 with a standard error of 
0.1). We have checked whether the peer effect we find for non-native English speakers is 
attributable to new school entrants with English as an additional language, since Gould et al 
(2005) suggests that new immigrants into schools in Israel have a detrimental impact on their 
schoolmates’ academic progress, possibly because of the additional demands they place on 
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resources. However, in our case new entrants do not explain our finding that pupils progress 
marginally faster when few of their schoolmates have English as an additional language. 
Whatever the cause, the magnitude of the effect is very small:  a one-standard deviation 
increase in the proportion of English first language pupils is linked to, at most, a 0.8 
percentile move up the pupil distribution of age-14 achievement (2.8% of one standard 
deviation). 
4.6 Using information on early achievements 
As the final part of our analysis we turn to consider whether unobserved pupil trends in 
achievement could be masking important peer group influences. For example, whilst not 
entirely plausible, it is not impossible that trends in pupil achievement and the level of peer 
group quality are negatively correlated, which might mean that peer group effects and 
individual trends tend to be self cancelling. There is clearly no way we can separately identify 
peer effects on achievement gains between ages 11 and 14 from individual trends in 
achievement between age 11 and 14. However, we can, for a sub-group of years 2005 and 
2006 in our census, control for pre-existing individual pupil trends by including information 
on age-7 test results in our regressions. Age 7 test results also provide additional information 
on sorting in secondary schools. 
Table 9 presents our findings on these issues. Each column presents the coefficients and 
standard errors from a separate regression, with primary × secondary fixed effects. The first 
column is a ‘sorting’ model in which a pupil’s age-7 test score percentile is regressed on age-
7 test percentile of age-14 peers and age-11 test percentile of age-14 peers (where these peers 
are restricted to come from primary schools other than the pupil’s own). Clearly, the positive 
coefficients in Column 1 are not evidence of causal peer group influence, since there is no 
direct link between a pupil’s age 7 and 11 scores and the age 7 and 11 scores of secondary 
school peers coming from other primary schools. Like those from the regressions of pupil 
age-11 scores on peer’s age-11 scores in Table 3 onwards, these coefficients arise through 
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non-random sorting over time into secondary school year groups, even within primary × 
secondary school groups over time. Turning now to the value-added models in Column 2, 
which condition on a pupil’s age-7 and age-11 test scores to control for individual trends, we 
again find little evidence that there are benefits from secondary education amongst peers with 
higher age 7 or age 11 test scores. Yes, the coefficient on peers’ age-11 test scores in the 
bottom right hand cell is marginally significant and positive. But the implied effects are 
miniscule: a one standard deviation increase in peer group quality is linked to a mere 1.7% of 
one standard deviation increase in a pupil’s own age-14 achievement. 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
In England, pupils re-sort themselves into new school groups when they move from primary 
to secondary schools at the age of 11. Part of this re-assignment is through preference, and 
part will be random because of failure to secure schools of choice or because of unanticipated 
variation in peer group quality within schools of choice. We have used this re-allocation at 
age 11 as a source of variation in peer group quality within primary-secondary school pairs 
over time, but find no evidence that, on average, pupils who end up in peer groups with higher 
age-11 ability progress faster academically between ages 11 and 14. There is a link between 
the age 11 test scores of secondary school mates and a pupil’s own age-14 test scores, but this 
is caused by sorting: a pupil’s age-11 and age-7 primary school test scores appear to be just as 
sensitive to his or her secondary school mates age-11 and age-7 primary school test scores, 
even when these schoolmates come from primary schools other than the pupil’s own. There is 
clearly no way such a link can be attributed to school-based peer influence. Hence, we are 
driven to the conclusion that there are no general educational spillover or peer group benefits 
in the context we have studied. 
We do find evidence that this zero average effect masks heterogeneity in response to peer 
group quality, with differences according to pupil prior achievement. Pupils in the middle of 
the distribution have slightly higher achievement in the company of high achievers, 
 - 31 -
suggesting a classic spillover benefit from engagement with more able schoolmates. 
However, one of the strongest findings is that low achieving pupils lose out substantially as 
the share of pupils in all other quintiles increases. The reasons for this negative spillover from 
higher achievers must remain a conjecture, but candidate explanations are that low achievers 
are demotivated or receive less attention if they are in a minority. High achievers also seem to 
lose out if they sort into schools mainly with other high achievers and benefit from a more 
mixed school intake. We find no evidence of contextual effects from the income, ethnic 
minority, gender or age mix, although there seems to be a marginal advantage to being in 
schools with more students who have English as a first language. 
Given these findings, it is hard to believe that the efforts to which some parents go to 
secure schools with a ‘good’ peer-group are worthwhile, purely in terms of the improvement 
in educational achievement that better quality peer-groups can offer. Possibly, there are peer 
group influences on academic related behaviours which we cannot observe – like the decision 
to do homework – but given our evidence these behaviours have no payoff in terms of 
achievement. Possibly, there are peer group influences on subsequent educational decisions – 
staying on at school etc. – which we have not considered in this study, though we find such a 
possibility unlikely given our lack of evidence of any substantive influence on achievement at 
age 14. Perhaps, however, better peer-groups provide other immediate and long run benefits – 
physical safety, emotional security, familiarity, life-time friendship networks, or simply 
exclusivity –  which make schools with good peer groups desirable commodities, regardless 
of whether they offer any educational advantages. 
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 Table 1: A non-exhaustive summary of school peer effect estimates from this century   
Studies  Context Outcome  
 
Peer-group or 
treatment 
Methodology Approx order of 
magnitude 
Hoxby (2000) Texas schools, 
US 
3rd grade test 
Scores 
Classmates’ tests, 
gender and race 
Cohort-cohort 
variation in gender 
and race 
1.s.d. ? 0.02 s.d. 
(based on gender 
balance) 1
Gaviria and 
Raphael (2001) 
US, NELS data 8th graders 
dropping out 
School mates 
dropping out 
IV using peers 
characteristics 
1 s.d. ? 0.04 s.d. 
Sacerdote (2001) Dartmouth 
College US 
College Grade 
Point Average  
Roommates’ 
Grade Point 
Average 
Random assignment 
to rooms 
1.s.d. ? 0.07 s.d. 
McEwan  (2003)  Chile, cross-
section census 
8th grade Test 
Scores 
Classmates’ 
background 
School fixed effects 
in cross section 
1.s.d. ? 0.27 s.d 
change in mothers 
education. 
Hanushek (2003) Texas 
elementary 
schools 
Test Scores School grade prior 
achievement 
School-by-grade 
fixed effects 
1 s.d. ?  < 0.08 
s.d.2
Zimmerman 
(2003) 
Williams 
College, US 
College Grade 
Point Average 
Roommate’s prior 
SAT scores 
Random assignment 
to rooms 
1 s.d. ? 0.05 s.d. 
Cullen, Jacob and 
Levitt (2003) 
Chicago public 
schools 
Test Scores, and 
others 
Attendance at 
oversubscribed 
schools 
Assignment by 
lottery 
Near zero and 
insignificant 
Sanbonmatsu et 
al. (2004) 
Moving to 
Opportunity 
experiment 
School Test 
Scores 
Opportunity to 
move home 
Policy experiment/ 
random assignment 
Near zero and 
insignificant 
Angrist and Lang 
(2004) 
Boston Metco 
programme 
4rd grade test 
sores 
Reassigned low-
scoring students  
School reassignemt 
and IV from class 
size limits 
“little evidence of 
socially or 
statistically 
significant effects” 
Vigdor and 
Nechyba (2004) 
North Carolina 
primary 
schools 
5th  grade test 
scores 
Classmates’ prior 
test scores 
School fixed 
effects/apparent 
random assignment 
1 s.d. ? 0.03 s.d. 
Arcidiacono and 
Nicholson (2005) 
US Medial 
schools 
Board exam 
scores  
Classmates’ 
admission tests 
School fixed effects Negative and 
insignificant 
Ammermueller 
and Pischke 
(2006) 
Europe primary 
schools 
Reading test 
scores 
Classmate’s test 
scores 
School fixed effects 1 s.d. ? 0.07 s.d. 
Lavy, et al (2007) Israeli high 
schools 
Matriculation 
outcomes 
School proportion 
of grade repeaters 
School fixed effects 
and trends 
1 s.d. ? 0.006 s.d. 
3  Elasticity < 0.01 
Hoxby and 
Weingarth (2005) 
Wake County 
schools 
End of grade 
tests 
Classmate’s prior 
test scores 
Student, school fixed 
effects + 
reassignments 
1 s.d. ? 0.25 s.d.4 
non-linear effects 
Goux and Maurin 
(2007) 
France, 1997 
cross-section 
3rd grade test 
scores 
1st grade 
schoolmates 
IV using 
schoolmates’ age 
1.s.d. ? 0.26.s.d. 
Kang (2007) S. Korea 
middle schools 
Grade 7 and 8 
maths scores 
Classmates’ prior 
test scores 
School fixed effects 
and IV 
1 s.d. ? 0.08 s.d.5
Magnitudes are reported for a 1 s.d. change in peer distribution using the best information available in the results 
1Hoxby does not provide the descriptives to make this translation straightforward. On p.23 “an all female class would score 
one-fifth of a standard deviation higher in reading”, which is equivalent to a 51 percentage point change in the female share. 
However, we estimate the standard deviation in the proportion female to be about 0.056 (given 49% female and random 
assignment into class sizes of about 80; see Table 1). Hence a 1.s.d. change gives a 0.056/0.51*0.20 = 0.022. 
2Our calculation based on the tabulated results differs from that reported in the paper’s conclusions, which seems to be based 
on the effect of a change in peer group mean tests scores equal to 1.s.d. of the pupil distribution, rather than the peer group 
distribution 
3Standard deviations not given. Our calculation is based on 4.5% repeaters randomly assigned across schools of size 175, 
giving a standard deviation in the proportion of repeaters = 0.016. The total proportion matriculating is 0.609 giving an 
outcome standard deviation of 0.488. The coefficient on repeaters in the matriculation estimates is -0.178 
3Curiously the overall student s.d. is less then reported between-class standard deviation in the tables, so this figure is likely 
to be an upper bound. OLS estimates are zero. 
4Kang reports much higher figures based on the effect of a change in peer group mean tests scores equal to 1.s.d. of the pupil 
distribution. We report the effect of a 1.s.d. change in the peer group distribution, which is 0.30 (Table 1) 
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 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics   
 Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Age-11 tests, percentiles 50.524 28.821 
Age-14 tests, percentiles 50.371 28.779 
Age-14 peers’ mean age 11 test percentiles, all secondary peers 50.178 8.433 
Age-14 peers’ mean age 11 test percentiles, peers from other primary 50.060 8.622 
 – residual within own-primary groups 0.000 5.258 
 –residual within own-primary-secondary groups 0.000 2.867 
   
Primary school quality estimated effects (age 11 to 7 point scores) 13.775 0.885 
Mean primary school quality amongst peers from other primary schools 13.783 0.426 
 – residual within own-primary groups 0.000 0.192 
 –residual within own-primary-secondary groups 0.000 0.075 
   
Number of peers from other primary 154.053 53.377 
Number of peers from own primary 29.630 25.565 
   
Number of observations 2019455 
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Table 3: Association between pupil test percentile (age 11 and 14) and secondary age-14 peer group 
mean age-11 test percentile. Each cell is a separate regression. 
 OLS Within-primary Within-primary x secondary 
Dependent variable Age-
11 
tests 
on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-
14 
tests 
on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-
14, 
peers 
age 11 
tests | 
own 
age 11 
Age-
11 
tests 
on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-14 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-
14, 
peers 
age 11 
tests | 
own 
age 11 
Age-
11 
tests 
on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-14 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-
14, 
peers 
age 11 
tests | 
own 
age 11 
Age-14 peer group: No pupil control variables 
All secondary year-
group peers 
0.935 
(0.003) 
1.051 
(0.014) 
0.264
(0.014) 
0.676
(0.016) 
0.741
(0.023) 
0.158
(0.012) 
0.382 
(0.012) 
0.104 
(0.017) 
-0.224
(0.014) 
All secondary | own 
primary school 
0.472 
(0.016) 
0.842 
(0.018) 
0.434
(0.013) 
0.627
(0.019) 
0.756
(0.022) 
0.212
(0.009) 
0.129 
(0.012) 
0.121 
(0.015) 
§0.010
(0.013) 
From other primary 
schools only 
0.779 
(0.013) 
0.956 
(0.017) 
0.300
(0.013) 
0.572
(0.020) 
0.692
(0.024) 
0.200
(0.009) 
0.135 
(0.013) 
0.125 
(0.014) 
§0.009
(0.011) 
          
Age-14 peer group: With pupil control variables 
All secondary year-
group peers 
0.806 
(0.008) 
0.891 
(0.017) 
0.215
(0.015) 
0.574
(0.018) 
0.602
(0.027) 
0.107
(0.014) 
0.378 
(0.011) 
0.098 
(0.017) 
-0.227
(0.014) 
All secondary | own 
primary school 
0.372 
(0.012) 
0.710 
(0.021) 
0.389
(0.013) 
0.508
(0.023) 
0.617
(0.024) 
0.176
(0.010) 
0.122 
(0.013) 
0.114 
(0.017) 
§0.008
(0.012) 
From other primary 
schools only 
0.618 
(0.018) 
0.783 
(0.022) 
0.264
(0.013) 
0.452
(0.024) 
0.554
(0.028) 
0.164
(0.010) 
0.130 
(0.013) 
0.120 
(0.014) 
§0.008
(0.011) 
          
Table reports regression coefficients, and standard errors clustered at local education authority level. All 
coefficients statistically significant at 0.1% level or better, except § insignificant.Unreported control variables 
are: age in months, ethnic group (7 dummies), free school meal entitled, English first language, male, year 
dummies, peer group size. Number of observations 2200213. Number of primary school groups 14922. Number 
of primary x secondary groups  
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 Table 4: Association between pupil tests (age 11 and 14) and secondary peer group quality: more 
stringent specifications 
 Within primary x secondary 
x postcode 
Within x primary x 
secondary  x trends 
Within primary x secondary 
 Age-11 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-14 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-
14, 
peers 
age 11 
tests | 
own 
age 11 
Age-11 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-14 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-
14, 
peers 
age 11 
tests | 
own 
age 11 
Age-11 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-14 
tests on 
peers 
age-11 
tests 
Age-14, 
peers age 
11 tests | 
own age 
11 
Own year-group 
(14) 
0.093 
(0.026) 
0.082 
(0.026) 
§0.005
(0.019) 
0.068
(0.010) 
0.078
(0.010) 
§-0.005
(0.010) 
0.139 
(0.013) 
0.122 
(0.013) 
§0.002
(0.011) 
Younger year-
group (13) 
- - - - - - 0.044 
(0.009) 
§0.010 
0.011) 
§-0.028
(0.011) 
Older year-group 
(15) 
- - - - - - 0.053 
(0.010) 
§-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.061
(0.012) 
Table reports regression coefficients, and standard errors clustered on local education authority. All coefficients 
statistically significant at 0.1% level or better, except §. A pupil’s peer group is the group of pupils in same year 
(grade) in secondary school originating from schools other than pupil’s own primary school. Unreported control 
variables in column 2 are: age in months, ethnic group (7 dummies), free school meal entitled, English first 
language, male, year dummies, number of peer group size. Number of observations 2197575 columns 1-3, 
2200213 columns 4-6, 1782507 in columns 7-9. Trends estimated separately using 599987 auxiliary regressions 
for each primary x secondary group. Number of postcode x secondary x primary groups = 1450271. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Association between pupil tests (age 11 and 14) and secondary peer group quality measured 
by origin schools’ value-added points. Within-primary x secondary models. Each cell is a separate 
regression. 
 Peers age-11 
tests 
Age-11 tests on 
peers’ primary 
school quality 
Age-14 tests on 
peers’ primary 
school quality 
Age-14 on peers 
primary school 
quality | own age 
11 test score 
Mean origin primary school 
value-added of age-14 peers from 
other primary 
4.043
(0.377) 
§0.535
(0.293) 
§0.482 
(0.359) 
§0.023
(0.304) 
Table reports regression coefficients, and standard errors clustered on local education authority. All coefficients 
statistically significant at 0.1% level or better, except §. A pupil’s peer group is the group of pupils in same year 
(grade) in secondary school originating from schools other than pupil’s own primary school. Unreported control 
variables are: age in months, ethnic group (7 dummies), free school meal entitled, English first language, male, 
year dummies, number of peer group size. Number of observations 2200194. Value added in origin primary 
schools is based on pupils aged 11 in the year that the main estimation sample is aged 14 – see text for details. 
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Table 6: Non-linear and complementary effects: Association between pupil test percentiles (age 14), 
secondary peer group age-11 quintile and own age-11 score quintile. Within-primary-secondary 
model. All cells are from a single regression. 
 Mean peer 
group quintile 2 
Mean peer 
group quintile 3 
Mean peer 
group quintile 4 
Mean peer 
group quintile 5 
     
Own age-11 score quintile 1 
Row peer effects p-value 0.000 
**-0.871
(0.156) 
**-0.639
(0.123) 
**-0.610 
(0.126) 
-0.165
(0.160) 
Own age-11 score quintile 2 
Row peer effects p-value 0.190 
-0.093
(0.135) 
0.031
(0.145) 
0.140 
(0.145) 
0.324
(0.169) 
Own age-11 score quintile 3 
Row peer effects p-value 0.000 
**0.560
(0.149) 
0.251
(0.160) 
*0.486 
(0.164) 
*0.543
(0.153) 
Own age-11 score quintile 4 
Row peer effects p-value 0.000 
*0.549
(0.170) 
0.296
(0.156) 
0.387 
(0.159) 
*0.452
(0.139) 
Own age-11 score quintile 5 
Row peer effects p-value 0.007 
0.151
(0.146) 
-0.181
(0.139) 
-0.290 
(0.136) 
-0.346
(0.173) 
     
Table reports regression coefficients, and standard errors clustered on local education authority. Coefficients 
represent peer group marginal effects moving right in each own-age-11 quintile group. Coefficients marked ** 
statistically significant at 0.1% level or better. Coefficients  marked * statistically significant at 1% level or 
better. A pupil’s peer group is the group of pupils in same year (grade) in secondary school originating from 
schools other than pupil’s own primary school. Unreported control variables are: age in months, ethnic group (7 
dummies), free school meal entitled, English first language, male, year dummies, peer group size, interactions 
between own-age-11 quintile and own-age-11-linear term. Number of observations 2200213. Replacing peer 
group test percentile with peer group primary school value added yields insignificant coefficients p-value 0.493 
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 Table 7: Complementary effects: Association between pupil test percentiles (age 14) and  secondary 
peer group age-11 quintile and own age-11 score quintile. Within-primary-secondary model. All cells 
are from a single regression. 
 Share of 
peer group 
in age-11 
quintile 1 
Share of 
peer group 
in age-11 
quintile 2 
Share of 
peer group 
in age-11 
quintile 3 
Share of 
peer group 
in age-11 
quintile 4 
Share of 
peer group 
in age-11 
quintile 5 
      
Own age-11 score quintile 1 
Row peer effects p-value 0.000 
- -2.358
(1.219) 
*-3.513
(1.259) 
**-4.874 
(1.327) 
**-8.598
(1.178) 
Own age-11 score quintile 2 
Row peer effects p-value 0.022 
2.683
(1.345) 
- 0.548
(1.382) 
3.070 
(1.386) 
*3.792
(1.206) 
Own age-11 score quintile 3 
Row peer effects p-value 0.000 
-0.139
(1.728) 
-0.628
(1.573) 
- 3.769 
(1.859) 
**6.539
(1.592) 
Own age-11 score quintile 4 
Row peer effects p-value 0.000 
-2.642
(1.216) 
**-4.484
(1.303) 
-2.414
(1.773) 
- 3.118
(1.431) 
Own age-11 score quintile 5 
Row peer effects p-value 0.110 
1.875
(1.312) 
*3.844
(1.492) 
2.594
(1.407) 
1.552 
(1.592) 
- 
      
Table reports regression coefficients, and standard errors clustered on local education authority. Coefficients 
marked ** statistically significant at 0.1% level or better. Coefficients  marked * statistically significant at 1% 
level or better. A pupil’s peer group is the group of pupils in same year (grade) in secondary school originating 
from schools other than pupil’s own primary school. Unreported control variables are: age in months, ethnic 
group (7 dummies), free school meal entitled, English first language, male, year dummies, peer group size, 
interactions between own-age-11 quintile and own-age-11-linear term. Number of observations 2200212. “Peer 
effects” test refers to F-test of row coefficients in the age 11 to 14 value added models. 
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 Table 8: Contextual effects: association between pupil test percentile (age 11 and 14) and secondary 
age-14 group characteristics, conditional on pupil own age-11 achievement. Each column is a separate 
regression. 
 Full Boys Girls On free 
meals 
Non free 
meals 
Old Young 
Mean Age-11 tests 0.007 
(0.011) 
0.008
(0.012) 
0.005
(0.012) 
0.006
(0.019) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.007
(0.011) 
Proportion boys -0.242 
(0.667) 
0.737
(0.728) 
-1.054
(0.736) 
1.334
(1.270) 
-0.473 
(0.668) 
-0.143 
(0.710) 
-0.352
(0.738) 
Age at start of year 
(months) 
0.096 
(0.105) 
0.090
(0.122) 
0.075
(0.114) 
0.128
(0.160) 
0.079 
(0.112) 
0.077 
(0.112) 
0.099
(0.115) 
Proportion white -0.063 
(0.422) 
-0.250
(0.455) 
0.141
(0.467) 
1.059
(0.794) 
-0.184 
(0.422) 
-0.084 
(0.455) 
-0.074
(0.428) 
Proportion English first 
language 
**2.728 
(0.658) 
**2.491
(0.656) 
**3.059
(0.916) 
2.301
(1.232) 
**2.582 
(0.648) 
*2.369 
(0.810) 
**3.096
(0.632) 
Proportion on free-meals 0.300 
(0.902) 
0.995
(0.961) 
-0.485
(1.101) 
0.041
(1.374) 
0.099 
(1.091) 
0.661 
(0.947) 
-0.231
(1.024) 
Observations 2.20m 1.10m 1.11m 297105 1.90m 1.08m 1.12m 
Table reports regression coefficients, and standard errors clustered on local education authority. All coefficients 
statistically insignificant at 10% level , except *significant at 1%, **significant at 0.1% A pupil’s peer group is 
the group of pupils in same year (grade) in secondary school originating from schools other than pupil’s own 
primary school. Unreported control variables are: age in months, ethnic group (7 dummies), free school meal 
entitled, English first language, male, year dummies, peer group size. F-test of group variables excluding 
proportion English first language, p-value>0.8. 
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Table 9: Association between pupil test percentiles (age 7 and 14) and secondary peer group mean 
age-7 and mean age-11 percentiles. Each column is a separate regression. 
 Age-7 tests Age-14 tests | own 
age 7,  11 test score 
   
Age-14 peers’ age 7 tests, from other primary schools 0.121 
(0.030) 
§0.020
(0.025) 
Age 14 peers’ age 11 test, from other primary schools  §0.044 
(0.024) 
§0.046
(0.025) 
   
Table reports regression coefficients, and standard errors clustered on local education authority. All coefficients 
statistically significant at 0.1% level or better, except §. A pupil’s peer group is the group of pupils in same year 
(grade) in secondary school originating from schools other than pupil’s own primary school. Unreported control 
variables are: age in months, ethnic group (7 dummies), free school meal entitled, English first language, male, 
year dummies, number of peer group size. Number of observations 869447.  
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